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I. INTRODUCTION
You land at your hometown airport after taking a trip abroad when suddenly,
a United States federal agent starts barking orders at you: Give me your phone. 1
Give me your laptop.2 Give me your camera.3 Sit here.4 Confused and scared, you
do what you are told. 5 You watch as the officer looks through your pictures, text
messages, and emails. 6
When you finally get the courage to ask why, the response is: this is a border
of the United States—a reason is not required to search your personal
electronics.7 Next, you hear: I am going to retain your electronic devices. 8 They
will be transported to an off-site facility and forensically searched.9 Thank you
for crossing the United States border.10
From there, you later learn federal agents took your electronic devices to an
off-site facility to make an exact copy of all the data on your electronic devices—
including all your deleted files. 11 At the off-site facility, officers could spend

1. See Matt Novak, 9 Horror Stories From People Who Had Their Electronic Devices Searched at the
Border, GIZMODO (Oct. 9, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/9-horror-stories-of-people-who-had-their-electronic-dev1818730022 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (recounting stories of Customs and Border
Patrol taking individual’s phones and searching them).
2. See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s laptops and searching
them).
3. See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s cameras and searching
them).
4. See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol making individual’s sit and watch agents
search their electronic devices).
5. See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol making individual’s sit and watch agents
search their electronic devices).
6. See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s electronic devices,
searching through the content of the devices, and question individuals about the contents).
7. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977) (holding that border searches are reasonable
because they are conducted at the border).
8. See Novak, supra note 1 (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol retaining individual’s
electronic devices after they are free to go).
9. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding a forensic search of an
electronic device at an off-site facility away from the initial stop was constitutional because law enforcement
had individualized suspicion for the forensic search).
10. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding no suspicion is required
to forensically search an electronic device at the border).
11. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546–47 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing how border
searches may be conducted away from the border).
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months combing through all your data.12 In technical words, the United States
can conduct a forensic search of your electronic devices without having any
suspicion to do so.13
The above encounter is legal at any border within the Eleventh Circuit’s
jurisdiction.14 This scenario is a reality for travelers coming in and out of the
numerous airports and seaports in the Eleventh Circuit. 15 This jurisdiction
includes Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, the busiest airport in
the world with 104 million travelers in 2017.16 The above situation exists because
Eleventh Circuit precedent declares forensic searches and seizures without any
suspicion constitutional when initiated at any border. 17
Congress and the Judicial Branch of the United States have limited
protections at borders since the founding of this country.18 Both branches have
allowed a lower level of protection at borders because of the desire to secure the
border.19 A circuit split has emerged, creating different levels of individualized
protections against forensic searches of electronic devices at the border. 20
The law is clear in the United States; law enforcement agents are allowed to
manually search any electronic devices without any level of suspicion at a
border.21 Additionally, such searches and seizures happen frequently. 22 Law
enforcement can lawfully conduct manual searches of electronic devices at the
border without a warrant, a showing of probable cause, or even reasonable
suspicion to stop (seize) an individual. 23 The jurisdictional split occurs when law
12. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 141(holding a forensic search of an electronic device at an off-site facility
away from the initial stop was constitutional because law enforcement had individualized suspicion for the
forensic search).
13. See United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016)
(describing OS Triage as a software the government uses to make an exact copy of an electronic device in order
to conduct a forensic search of the device).
14. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding that no suspicion is required to forensically search an
electronic device at the border).
15. Maureen O’Hare, The World’s Busiest Airports in 2017 Revealed, CNN (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/worlds-busiest-airports-preliminary 2017/index.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding that no suspicion is required
to forensically search an electronic device at the border).
16. O’Hare, supra note 15.
17. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding that no suspicion is required to forensically search an
electronic device at the border).
18. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977) (holding border searches are reasonable
because they are conducted at the border).
19. See id. (holding that border searches are reasonable because they are conducted at the border).
20. Infra Part IV.
21. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004) (“Congress has always granted the
Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a
warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this
country.”).
22. Novak, supra note 1.
23. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 149 (“Congress has always granted the Executive plenary authority
to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate
the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.”).
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enforcement conducts a forensic search of electronic devices at the border. 24 A
forensic search occurs when a computer program is connected to an electronic
device, and the program creates an exact copy of the electronic device. 25 This
program makes exact copies of all saved, viewed, and deleted data, starting with
the very first piece of information viewed on the device. 26 These devices include
cellphones, computers, and cameras.27
In all jurisdictions but one, where a Court of Appeals has ruled on this issue,
law enforcement agents at United States borders are required by law to have
some level of suspicion to conduct a forensic search. 28 The Ninth Circuit requires
reasonable suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border. 29 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit requires some level of individualized suspicion to do
the same forensic search.30 Both levels of suspicion require specific facts that
lead law enforcement to believe the electronic device possibly contains criminal
evidence. 31
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ limitations. 32
The Eleventh Circuit does not require any level of suspicion before conducting
forensic searches of electronic devices at the border. 33 The Eleventh Circuit made
this rule despite the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Riley v. California that
warrantless searches of electronic devices violate the Constitution via the Fourth
Amendment.34
The Fourth Amendment would cease to exist at United States borders
without the guaranteed protections against unreasonable and warrantless searches
and seizures.35 To alleviate the potential miscarriage of justice embedded in the
Eleventh Circuit’s standard, the Supreme Court or Congress should require all
law enforcement agents at United States borders to identify some level of
suspicion before conducting a forensic search of electronic devices. 36 To that end,
24. See United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting only two federal court
cases have required reasonable suspicion for a forensic search).
25. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 548 (D.D.C. 2014).
26. Id. at 547.
27. Id. at 552.
28. See Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d at 293 (noting only two federal court cases have required reasonable
suspicion for a forensic search).
29. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding reasonable
suspicion is needed to forensically search an electronic device at the border).
30. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding the forensic search of the
electronic device at a facility away from the initial stop was constitutional because law enforcement had
individualized suspicion).
31. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (noting reasonable suspicion arises when an officer can
articulate facts that lead him to believe the suspect may be connected to criminal activity).
32. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018).
33. Id.
34. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014) (holding modern cell phones require a high level of
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. Infra Part IV.
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this Comment proceeds as follows. 37 Part II discusses the formation and
development of the border search doctrine in the context of the Fourth
Amendment.38 Part III addresses what constitutes a forensic search. 39 Part IV
analyzes the leading cases on forensic searches as well as the two Eleventh
Circuit cases that created this circuit split.40 Part V proposes a standard created
either by Congress or the Supreme Court that requires law enforcement to have
some level of suspicion prior to a forensic search at the border. 41
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES BORDER SEARCHES
The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is
relaxed at the border, but still in effect.42 However, the recent precedent from the
Eleventh Circuit revoked all previous protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures at the border.43 Section A discusses the laws relating to border
searches before the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.44 Section B addresses
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.45 Section C examines the Supreme Court’s major decisions on the
protections against unconstitutional border searches. 46
A. Pre-Fourth Amendment Border Protections
The Framers of the United States considered searches at the border
reasonable per se before the Fourth Amendment existed. 47 Before Congress
ratified the Fourth Amendment, the same Congress passed a customs law
allowing for warrantless searches at borders.48 Specifically, the law “granted
customs officials ‘full power and authority’ to enter and search ‘any ship or
vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.’”49 The Supreme Court relied on
this legislative history to demonstrate that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment
37. Infra Parts II-V.
38. Infra Part II.
39. Infra Part III.
40. Infra Part IV.
41. Infra Part V.
42. GOV. PRINTING OFF., FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1199, 1243 (1992),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/html/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5.htm (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
43. Infra Part IV.
44. Infra Part II.A.
45. Infra Part II.B.
46. Infra Part II.C.
47. See United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (discussing the Founders’ intention to make
border searches reasonable per se).
48. GOV. PRINTING OFF., supra note 42, at 1200.
49. Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5.1 Stat. 29 § 24.
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did not intend for the Fourth Amendment’s protections to apply at the border. 50
The Court said “this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for
adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members
of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind (at the border) . . .
as unreasonable, and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the
amendment.”51 Drawing on the founders, our jurisprudence accepted the notion
that border searches are per se constitutional absent a warrant or probable cause
well before the establishment of the Fourth Amendment.52
B. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches
and seizures of one’s person, home, papers, and effects. 53 “A search compromises
the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion
over his or her person or property.”54 A search is unreasonable when it is
conducted without a warrant or a legally accepted exception. 55
The creation of the Fourth Amendment was in direct response to the intrusive
searches the American colonists experienced from the British. 56 The British
executed unreasonable searches and seizures of colonists without a warrant or
with general warrants.57 In a speech to the British Parliament on general
warrants, William Pitt described the need to protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures:58 “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all
the force of the crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow
through it—the storm may enter, the rain may enter—but the King of England
cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.”59 The drafters took a cue from Mr. Pitt’s warning to Parliament and
ratified the Fourth Amendment, ensuring protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures.60

50. United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016).
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
55. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”).
56. GOV. PRINTING OFF., supra note 42, at 1199.
57. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 188 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Because the
Crown had employed the general warrant, rather than the warrantless search, to invade the privacy of the
colonists without probable cause and without limitation, it is not surprising that the hatred of the colonists
focused on it.”).
58. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1994).
59. Id.
60. United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
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Under the Fourth Amendment, searches or seizures are unreasonable when
conducted without a warrant or probable cause. 61 However, there are several
exceptions to both the warrant and probable cause requirements. 62 One wellestablished exception provides that searches and seizures at the border are per se
reasonable and do not need a warrant or probable cause.63
C. Border Search Cases
Since the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Amendment’s application to border searches in several landmark
cases.64 Subsection 1 reviews the Court’s analysis of physical searches of
property at the border in United States v. Flores-Montano.65 Subsection 2
addresses the Court’s analysis of searches of individuals at the border in United
States v. Montoya De Hernandez.66
1. United States v. Flores-Montano
In this case, United States Border Patrol agents stopped Mr. Flores-Montano
when he tried to enter the United States through a port in Southern California. 67
After the agent instructed Mr. Flores-Montano to get out of his car, the agents
transported Mr. Flores-Montano’s vehicle to a secondary inspection station. 68
There, agents called a mechanic to inspect the vehicle. 69 Upon arrival, the
mechanic, “raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and unscrewed
the bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of the vehicle, and then
disconnected some hoses and electrical connections.”70 After the mechanic
removed the gas tank, he used a chemical substance to open the top of the gas
tank to see inside and found contraband.71
61. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
62. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762–63 (1969) (holding that probable cause nor a warrant is required to search an individual or the area
within their grabbing range after they have been lawfully arrested); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336 –37
(1990) (holding that when officers conduct a valid arrest in a home, if there is probable cause to believe harm
may be lurking in the home, the officers may do a protective sweep of the home without a warrant).
63. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977) (holding border searches are reasonable
because they are conducted at the border).
64. E.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); United States v. Montoya De
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
65. Infra Section II.C.1.
66. Infra Section II.C.2.
67. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 150.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 151.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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The Court found both the search and the seizure constitutional.72 According
to the Court, Mr. Flores-Montano did not have a privacy interest in his fuel tank,
and the agents did not need reasonable suspicion to disassemble his fuel tank. 73
The Court conducted a balancing test of the government’s interest in protecting
the border and Mr. Flores-Montano’s right to privacy.74 The Court found the
government was the clear winner.75 “The Government’s interest in preventing the
entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international
border.”76 In support of this analysis, the Court quoted United States v. Ramsey,
“searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign
to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into
this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the
border.”77
The Court’s holding expanded the border search doctrine to allow physical
manipulation of personal effects.78 Although agents deconstructed and physically
manipulated Mr. Flores-Montano’s property, the Court considered it a lawful
manual search.79
2. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez
In this case, Ms. Montoya De Hernandez flew to Los Angeles, California
from Bogota, Colombia, but customs officials did not allow her to enter the
United States.80 A United States customs inspector stopped her because she had
made several recent trips to both Los Angeles and Miami. 81 The inspector took
her to a second inspection site, questioned her, and led her to a different area for
a pat-down and strip search.82 After the pat down search, officers believed Ms.
Montoya De Hernandez was smuggling drugs inside of her body. 83
After Ms. Montoya De Hernandez refused an x-ray because she asserted she
was pregnant, the inspectors gave her three options—leave on the first flight back
to Colombia, consent to the x-ray, or remain “in detention until she produced a
monitored bowel movement that would confirm or rebut the inspectors’
suspicions.”84 Due to issues with her visa, the option to fly back was

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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Id. at 155.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 152–53 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 607, 616 (1977)).
Id. at 155–56.
Id.
United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 533 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 534–35.
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unavailable. 85 Now limited to two options, Ms. Montoya De Hernandez opted to
not eat, drink, or use the restroom for sixteen hours. 86 Eventually, a court order
forced her to submit to a pregnancy test in order to medically clear her for an xray and rectal examination. 87
The Court held the search and seizure of Ms. Montoya De Hernandez
constitutional and the sixteen-hour detention was not unreasonably long.88 The
Court went on to say the search and seizure needed only reasonable suspicion
because it occurred at the border and found law enforcement had reasonable
suspicion, making the search constitutional. 89
III. ELECTRONIC SEARCHES
Law enforcement conducts two types of electronic device searches: manual
and forensic. 90 At any United States border, law enforcement may manually
search an electronic device. 91 Courts consider a manual search of an electronic
device a routine search, and therefore, legal. 92 However, any manual search of an
electronic device away from the border requires a warrant.93 Section A discusses
the protections the Court developed against warrantless searches of cellphones in
Riley v. California.94 Section B outlines routine and a non-routine border
search.95 Section C describes the difference between a manual and a forensic
search.96
A. Riley v. California
In Riley, the Supreme Court refused to extend the search incident to arrest 97
warrant exception to cellphones. 98 Absent specialized exigent circumstances,
such as remote wiping, data encryption, or potential physical threats from the

85. Id. at 535.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 544.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1016 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
91. Id. at 1015.
92. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2018).
93. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 388 (2014) (holding absent exigent circumstances, law
enforcement needs a warrant to search a cell phone).
94. Infra Section III.A.
95. Infra Section III.B.
96. Infra Section III.C.
97. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for
the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”).
98. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014).
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device, a warrant is required to search a cellphone. 99 The Court described why
cellphones require such a high level of protection: “[A] cell phone search would
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a
house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records
previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.”100
The Court listed personal information that may be on a cell phone: medical
records, calendars, contacts, messages, addresses, pictures, historic location data,
and apps for planning a budget, tracking a pregnancy, improving one’s romantic
life, and more. 101 The private information a cellphone contains is the type of
information the Fourth Amendment tries to protect against unreasonable
invasions. 102 In sum, Riley highlights the modern understanding that electronic
devices present unique privacy issues and deserve additional protections beyond
that of any other form of personal property. 103
B. Routine and Non-Routine Border Searches
Courts across the country agree that law enforcement officers at the border
are allowed to conduct routine searches of persons and their effects without
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant.104 In order to determine if a
search is routine, courts look at the degree of intrusiveness or invasiveness of the
search.105 Courts use the following factors when assessing whether the search
was routine:
“(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or
requires the suspect to disrobe; (ii) whether physical contact between Customs
officials and the suspect occurs during the search; (iii) whether force is used to
effect the search; (iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or
danger; (v) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and (vi) whether
the suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the
search.106
Non-routine searches can intrude deeply into a person’s privacy. 107
Recognized types of non-routine searches include strip searches, alimentary99. Id. at 388–89.
100. Id. at 396–97 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 395–96.
102. Id. at 408 (Alito, J., concurring).
103. See id. at 373 (holding cellphones may not be searched during a search incident to arrest absent a
warrant or exigent circumstances).
104. United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 1988).
105. Id. at 511.
106. Id. at 512.
107. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018).
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canal searches, and x-rays.108
On the other hand, routine searches at the border are exempt from the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 109 Types of routine searches include patdowns; pocket-dumps; moving or adjusting clothing; scanning, opening, and
rifling through the contents of bags or other closed containers; looking inside an
automobile gas tank; browsing contents of photograph albums, information
encoded on videotapes, or password-protected items; and having a dog sniff at an
individual’s groin. 110 Courts have also concluded manual searches of electronic
devices are considered routine.111
C. Manual and Forensic Searches
The search of a computer without any sophisticated forensic techniques and
in the same manner that a user would use the computer is a routine and manual
search.112 Therefore, a routine and manual search of an electronic device at the
border may be done by law enforcement without any reasonable suspicion. 113
The techniques used for a forensic search are different from a manual
search.114 A forensic search is more intrusive than a manual search because it
goes beyond what a normal user would see on a computer. 115 This is because a
forensic search uses “sophisticated technology-assisted search methodologies
[that] can exceed vastly the capacity of a human searching and viewing files.” 116
A forensic search starts “with the creation of a perfect ‘bitstream’ copy or
‘image’ of the original storage device.” 117 This bitstream copy is then saved as a
read-only file. 118 After that, a computer forensics expert uses specialized software
to look at the data.119 During this process, which can last anywhere from a day to
months, the expert reviews all of the contents on the “imaged hard drive,
examining the properties of individual files, and probing the drive’s unallocated

108. Id. at 144.
109. See id. at 141 (noting the manual search of Kolsuz’s phone was a routine search which are not
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements).
110. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D.D.C. 2014).
111. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 141 (noting the manual search of Kolsuz’s phone was a routine search and
routine searches are not subject to Fourth Amendment requirements).
112. Id. at 144.
113. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 295
(2015) (noting “[i]n most cases, searches at the border are always permitted even without reasonable
suspicion”); e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F. 3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[R]easonable suspicion is not
needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the border.”).
114. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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‘slack space’ to reveal deleted files.”120 The circuit split began when different
circuits announced different levels of suspicion required to conduct forensic
searches at the border.121
IV. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON FORENSIC SEARCHES AT THE BORDER
In 2018, the Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit to hold no level of
suspicion is required to forensically search an electronic device at the border. 122
Other circuits have reached the opposite holding. 123 Section A discusses the
precedent regarding forensic searches in the Fourth Circuit.124 Section B
examines similar precedent in the Ninth Circuit. 125 Finally, Section C looks at the
two Eleventh Circuit cases that eliminated the requirement of any suspicion
before forensically searching an electronic device at the border. 126
A. Fourth Circuit Forensic Border Search Law
The Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Kolsuz a forensic search of a
digital phone is a non-routine search that requires some level of individualized
suspicion. 127 In this case, Mr. Kolsuz had a history of attempting to illegally take
firearm parts out of the United States. 128 Before the incident at issue, law
enforcement agents stopped Mr. Kolsuz on two previous occasions for having
unregistered and unlicensed firearm parts in his suitcase. 129 In both prior
instances, Mr. Kolsuz attempted to fly from John F. Kennedy International
Airport to Turkey.130 Both times, law enforcement agents confiscated the illegal
firearms parts and instructed Mr. Kolsuz on the law. 131 After these warnings, Mr.
Kolsuz again tried to fly out of the United States, this time from Dulles
International Airport to Turkey. 132 United States law enforcement found multiple
firearms parts in his suitcase, including: eighteen handgun barrels, twenty-two
9mm handgun magazines, four .45 caliber handgun magazines, and other gun
120. Id.
121. Infra Part IV.
122. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018).
123. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding law
enforcement must have reasonable suspicion before conducting a forensic search of an electronic device at the
border); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018) (“forensic border search of a phone must be
treated as non-routine, permissible only on a showing of individualized suspicion”).
124. Infra Section IV.B.
125. Infra Section IV.C.
126. Id.
127. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146.
128. Id. at 138.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 139.
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components.133
The issue before the court was whether the agents’ confiscation of Mr.
Kolsuz’s cellphone and subsequent searches of the cellphone were
constitutional. 134 The first search was a manual search, which revealed recent
calls and text messages. 135 The court concluded the manual search was a routine
search and fell under the border search exception. 136 Thus, the court noted the
law enforcement officers did not need reasonable suspicion for the first search.137
The court considered the second search a forensic search. 138 The forensic
search occurred four miles away from Dulles International Airport at a Homeland
Security Investigation office. 139 During this search, a computer forensic agent ran
a program on the phone that created an 896-page report of the phone’s
contents.140 The report included “personal contact lists, emails, messenger
conversations, photographs, videos, calendar, web browsing history, and call
logs, along with a history of Kolsuz’s physical location down to precise GPS
coordinates.”141
The court held that officers must have individualized suspicion before
conducting non-routine forensic searches of electronic devices. 142 Despite the
court’s lack of a clear standard (e.g., reasonable suspicion), the court noted the
agents were correct in this case to rely on the reasonable suspicion standard. 143
The court further noted that despite Riley, no precedent requires anything above
reasonable suspicion when it comes to forensic searches of electronic devices at
the border.144
B. Ninth Circuit Forensic Border Search Law
The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Cotterman that there must be a
showing of reasonable suspicion before law enforcement can forensically search
an electronic device at the border. 145 Subsection 1 discusses the majority opinion
in Cotterman.146 Subsection 2 addresses the arguments raised by Judge
Callahan’s concurrence and Judge Smith’s dissent. 147
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 148 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
Id. at 147 (majority opinion).
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Infra Section IV.B.1.
Infra Section IV.B.2.
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1. Majority Opinion in United States v. Cotterman
In United States v. Cotterman, border agents stopped Mr. Cotterman and his
wife when the couple tried to enter the United States through Mexico. 148 Mr.
Cotterman’s previous convictions in 1992 for child molestation and lewd and
lascivious conduct triggered an alert at the border crossing. 149 Due to the alert,
agents stopped Mr. Cotterman’s vehicle. 150 After searching the vehicle, the
agents discovered two laptops and a camera.151 Law enforcement then
confiscated the devices and transported them 170 miles away to an Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office. 152 At the ICE office, a computer forensic
examiner used a forensic program to search the electronic devices. 153 During the
initial search of the computer, the agent discovered seventy-five images of child
pornography. 154
Later that day, the forensic examiner contacted Mr. Cotterman for assistance
in unlocking some password-protected files on Mr. Cotterman’s computer. 155 Mr.
Cotterman agreed to get back to the forensic examiner once he located the
passwords.156 Instead of supplying the passwords, Mr. Cotterman flew to Mexico
the next day and then onward to Australia. 157 Nevertheless, the forensic examiner
eventually gained access. 158 The computer had approximately 378 images of
child pornography.159 Most of the images were taken over a two- to three-year
period of the same young girl.160 Several photos depicted Mr. Cotterman sexually
molesting a young girl.161 The forensic examiner continued the search
discovering “hundreds more pornographic images, stories, and videos depicting
children.”162
At the first hearing of the case, the Ninth Circuit held reasonable suspicion
was not required for this search. 163 However, in an en banc hearing, the court
reversed and concluded reasonable suspicion was required for the forensic
searches of the electronic devices. 164 Nonetheless, the court determined the
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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officers had reasonable suspicion to forensically search Mr. Cotterman’s
computer and reversed motion to suppress.165
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in United States v. Cotterman
In her concurrence, Judge Callahan charged the majority with ignoring over a
century of Supreme Court precedent and argued this new rule of requiring
reasonable suspicion to forensically search electronic devices is “unworkable and
unnecessary, and [would] severely hamstring the government’s ability to protect
our borders.”166 Judge Callahan made two arguments in her concurrence.167
First, a review of the Supreme Court’s precedent shows the Court has tried to
keep standards for conducting searches at the border flexible.168 The Court has
only required reasonable suspicion in one case. 169 In that case, Montoya de
Hernandez, the individual was subjected to a 24-hour detention and several
intrusive examinations of her person. 170 In all remaining cases before the
Supreme Court, the Court confirmed the government’s wide authority to search
at the border.171
Judge Callahan’s second argument addressed the three possible border search
situations the Court held would not be per se reasonable, and concluded none
were applicable in this case.172 In Flores-Montano, the Court announced that a
border search might not be reasonable and would require reasonable suspicion in
three situations;173 “highly intrusive searches of the person; destructive searches
of property; and conducted in a ‘particularly offensive’ manner.”174 Judge
Callahan indicated the first two situations were plainly not applicable. 175 First,
border agents did not search Mr. Cotterman’s person—just his property. 176
Second, the border agents did not destroy Mr. Cotterman’s property.177 As for the
third justification, Judge Callahan argued searching a computer, which is capable
of storing a large amount of personal information, does not make the search
“particularly offensive.”178 For support, Judge Callahan cited Ninth Circuit
precedent stating searching computers does not enhance Fourth Amendment

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 970.
Id. at 971 (Callahan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 971–72.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 971–72 (citing United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
Id. at 972.
Id. at 973.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 974–75.
Id. at 973.
Id.
Id. at 977.
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protections.179 “[C]omputers are [not] special for Fourth Amendment purposes by
virtue of how much information they store; neither the quantity of information,
nor the form in which it is stored, is legally relevant in the Fourth Amendment
context.”180
In his dissent, Judge Smith voiced a policy concern stating the majority’s
ruling would burden law enforcement and create national security issues. 181 The
dissent said law enforcement would have to make a “complex legal
determination on the spot.”182 Under the standard created by the majority, law
enforcement must determine if a search of an individual’s data is allowed
because it is “unintrusive” or if the search is illegal because it is “comprehensive
and intrusive.”183 The dissent notes a Customs and Border Protection directive,
“border searches of electronic storage devices are ‘essential’ for ‘detect[ing]
evidence relating to terrorism and other national security matters.’”184 Echoes of
Judge Callahan’s and Judge Smith’s arguments are present in the two 2018
Eleventh Circuit cases adopting suspicion-less forensic searches at the border. 185
C. Eleventh Circuit Forensic Border Search Law
The Eleventh Circuit recently announced new precedent on the
constitutionality of searches of electronic devices at the border. 186 Subsection 1
reviews the Eleventh Circuit holding in United States v. Vergara.187 In that case,
the court rejected requiring a warrant or probable cause to forensically search
electronic devices at the border.188 Subsection 2 analyzes the Eleventh Circuit
case of United States v. Touset.189 Touset created the circuit split when the court
announced law enforcement does not need any suspicion to forensically search
an electronic device at the border.190

179. Id. at 978.
180. Id. (quoting United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008)).
181. Id. at 984 (Smith, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 985 (alteration in original).
185. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the Fourth Amendment
does not require any suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border); United States v.
Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding border searches never require probable cause or a
warrant and only highly intrusive border searches require reasonable suspicion).
186. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1229 (holding the Fourth Amendment does not require any suspicion for
forensic searches of electronic devices at the border); Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1309 (holding border searches never
require probable cause or a warrant and only highly intrusive border searches require reasonable suspicion).
187. Infra Section IV.C.1.
188. Infra Section IV.C.1.
189. Infra Section IV.C.2.
190. Infra Section IV.C.2.

70

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
1. United States v. Vergara
In Vergara, the Eleventh Circuit held border searches never require a warrant
or probable cause.191 Mr. Vergara returned to Florida on a cruise ship from
Mexico.192 Officers stopped and searched Mr. Vergara because of his prior
conviction for possession of child pornography. 193 During the search, officers
found three cellphones in Mr. Vergara’s possession. 194 During a manual search of
one phone, the officer immediately recognized a video as possible child
pornography. 195 The officer reached out to a criminal investigator with the
Department of Homeland Security who confirmed the video was child erotica. 196
After this discovery, a Homeland Security officer confiscated the cellphones in
order to conduct forensic searches on them. 197 The search uncovered “more than
100 images and videos of child pornography and erotica stored on Vergara’s
phones.”198
After reviewing the facts in this case, the court reaffirmed the law that
searches at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause. 199 However, the
court noted reasonable suspicion might be required in cases of “highly intrusive
searches of a person’s body such as a strip search or an x-ray examination.”200
The court implied searches of electronic devices, whether manual or forensic,
would not require a warrant or probable cause. 201 The court avoided the issue of
whether reasonable suspicion is required when forensically searching electronic
devices at the border because Mr. Vergara did not challenge the lack of
reasonable suspicion.202 Additionally, the court said only certain searches of a
person require reasonable suspicion, but reasonable suspicion is not required for
searches of property.203
Two months later, the same court in an opinion by the same judge held
suspicion-less forensic searches of electronic devices at the border are
constitutional. 204

191. Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1312.
192. Id. at 1311.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1314 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1311 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 1312.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1313.
203. Id. at 1312 (holding border searches do not require a warrant or probable and that only highly
intrusive searches of a person require reasonable suspicion).
204. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the Fourth Amendment
does not require any suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border).
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2. United States v. Touset
Judge Pryor, of the Eleventh Circuit, expanded the rule from Vergara by
announcing in Touset that no suspicion is required to forensically search an
electronic device at the border.205 In this case, the investigation of Mr. Touset
started long before he arrived at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
Airport.206
Xoom, a company that transmits money, noticed a pattern of transfers
consistent with “people it suspected were involved with child pornography.” 207
Xoom learned that Mr. Touset’s account was linked with Yahoo email and
messenger accounts.208 With that information, Xoom contacted both Yahoo and
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. 209 During an
investigation, Yahoo found the account Xoom identified. 210 The account had a
file containing child pornography. 211 Yahoo sent this information to the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which in turn notified the Cyber
Crime Center of the Department of Homeland Security. 212
After the Department of Homeland Security issued subpoenas in relation to
the investigation, Western Union responded with Mr. Touset’s name and post
office box, which was also linked to the Yahoo account. 213 All of this
investigation occurred before Mr. Touset’s international flight even touched
down in Atlanta, Georgia.214
Once Mr. Touset arrived, an officer from Customs and Border Protection
searched his luggage and discovered several electronic devices: two iPhones, a
camera, two laptops, two external hard drives, and two tablets. 215 Law
enforcement confiscated and conducted a forensic search on the devices
revealing child pornography on the laptops and the external hard drives. 216 With
this evidence, law enforcement secured a warrant to search Mr. Touset’s home in
Georgia.217 The search turned up evidence of thousands of images of child
pornography and uncovered Mr. Touset paid over $55,000 for “pornographic
pictures, videos, and webcam sessions” and an “excel spreadsheet that
documented the names, ages, and birthdates of young girls in the photos, as well

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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as his personal notes about them.” 218
The court held reasonable suspicion was not required to forensically search
the electronic devices because the search was of property and not a person.219 The
court openly acknowledged conducting an intrusive search of a person at the
border requires reasonable suspicion. 220 Further, the court conceded a search of
an electronic device may be intrusive; 221 however, the court stood by its
interpretation of the jurisprudence and held, “our precedents do not require
suspicion for [an] intrusive search of any property at the border.”222
Mr. Touset argued the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley was meant to protect
privacy by requiring a warrant to search all cellphones. 223 The court in Touset
disagreed and reiterated the holding in Riley is limited to the search incident to
arrest exception, which was not applicable with this case. 224 Therefore, the court
resorted to the border search doctrine for guidance. 225
The court reiterated the need for a balance between the government’s
security interest and an individual’s privacy interest. 226 The Ninth Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit in Cotterman and Kolsuz argued travelers could not protect their
privacy because it is impractical and unreasonable for travelers to travel without
their electronic devices.227 In contrast, the Touset court asserted travel has been
inconvenient for quite some time and travelers grow accustomed to
inconveniences. 228 The court mentioned some inconvenience of modern travel
such as “screening procedures that require passengers to unpack electronic
devices, separate and limit liquids, gels, and creams, remove their shoes, and
walk through a full-body scanner.”229 The court emphasized property, unlike
persons, could always be left at home when traveling and remain free from
searches. 230
After allowing suspicion-less forensic searches at borders, the court said, “if
we were to require reasonable suspicion for searches of electronic devices, we
would create special protections for the property most often used to store and

218. Id. at 1230–31.
219. See id. at 1234 (noting “property and persons are different”).
220. Id.
221. Cf. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Callahan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing searching a computer is not particularly offensive).
222. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (citing United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728–29, 732 (11th
Cir. 2009)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1236.
227. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Kolsuz,
890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018).
228. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235.
229. Id. (citing Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 767 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2014)).
230. Id.
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disseminate child pornography.”231 In the opinion, the court called upon Congress
to make a law dictating the standard required for a forensic search of electronic
devices at the border.232 “Instead of ‘charging unnecessarily ahead,’ we must
allow Congress to design the appropriate standard ‘through the more adaptable
legislative process and the wider lens of legislative hearings.’”233
In order to insulate the case from Supreme Court review, Judge Pryor wrote
the opinion in a manner limiting the Supreme Court’s ability to hear the case. 234
The court in Touset held that even if reasonable suspicion was required in order
for the search to be constitutional, law enforcement had reasonable suspicion for
the search.235 By holding the search constitutional, the Supreme Court would not
be able to change the outcome of this case, making the case nonjusticiable. 236 The
Supreme Court could only change the law, not the outcome, which likely
lessened the chance of Supreme Court review. 237
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Supporters of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Touset fail to look past the
limited reasoning the court supplies.238 In Touset, the court feared there was no
feasible way to protect against child pornography entering the country. 239 While
the court’s concern might be valid, it is also shortsighted. 240 Officials might stop
and search under the guise of protecting against child pornography, but how
would a traveler know that was the actual reason for the search?241 There is no
legal requirement for officers to explain the reason for a stop and search. 242 The
search could be motivated by any discriminatory basis, including gender,
political affiliation, religion, nationality, age, disability, or worse, no reason at
all.243
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1237.
233. Id. (citing United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 150 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
234. Kerr, supra note 113.
235. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
236. Kerr, supra note 113.
237. Id.
238. See generally Forensic Searches of Digital Information at the Border – Eleventh Circuit Holds that
Border Searches of Property Require No Suspicion, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1112 (2019) [hereinafter Forensic
Searches] (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit reasoning that preventing child pornography from entering the
country was a sufficient basis for allowing suspicionless forensic searches of electronic devices at the border).
239. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1236.
240. Forensic Searches, supra note 238, at 1119.
241. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Illinois, and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 9, United States v. Wanjiku, No. 18-1973 (7th
Cir. argued Nov. 7, 2018), 2018 WL 3602348, at *9 (“To rule otherwise would give the government unfettered
access to an incredible compendium of the most intimate aspects of people’s lives simply because they have
decided to travel internationally.”).
242. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
243. Cf. id. (holding no suspicion is required to forensically search an electronic device at the border).
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This “parade of horribles” could very easily turn into a reality. 244 Under the
Eleventh Circuit’s precedent, any forensic search of electronic devices at the
border is reasonable per se.245 Any traveler through any point of entry into the
United States in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction could have every electronic
device taken, copied, and forensically examined without cause. 246 The Fourth
Amendment is still in the Constitution, despite the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in
Touset.247
Not only is allowing law enforcement free range to forensically search any
electronic device unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, it implicates
other fundamental rights, namely, privacy.248 Consider the following
hypotheticals: honeymooners return home with private photos, a CEO of a
foreign entity has confidential strategic plans on her laptop, a doctor with patient
information in his email, an attorney with confidential client information on her
hard drive—all information the United States government can view, copy, and
study without cause.249
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
To resolve the circuit split and maintain the Fourth Amendment’s
protections, Congress should act to ensure forensic searches of electronics at the
border require reasonable suspicion.250 In lieu of a Congressional rule, Section A
addresses a possible Supreme Court solution. 251 Section B discusses the more
pragmatic solution of a law created by Congress. 252
A. Supreme Court Solution
In order to protect Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court should
review a case concerning forensic searches at the border. 253 To preserve the

244. Ben Zimmer, Where Did the Supreme Court Get ‘Its Parade of Horribles’?: How an Obscure
Fourth of July Custom from New England Spawned a Legal-World Insult, BOSTON GLOBE (July 1, 2012),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/06/30/where-did-supreme-court-get-its-paradehorribles/Y0jnIscamtgPEzO0PdtL9N/story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
245. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
246. See id. (holding no suspicion is required to forensically search an electronic device at the border).
247. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (holding forensic searches of electronic
devices at the border require no level of suspicion).
248. See Novak, supra note 1 (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s
phones and searching them).
249. See id. (recounting stories of Customs and Border Patrol taking individual’s phones and searching
them).
250. Infra Part VI.
251. Infra Section VI.A.
252. Infra Section VI.A.
253. See Kerr, supra note 113 (noting the Supreme Court will likely not take up United States v. Touset
because the Court would not be able to change the outcome of the case, only the law).
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Fourth Amendment and adhere to precedent, the Court should require reasonable
suspicion before conducting a forensic search of electronic devices at the
border.254 This would allow the Court to engage in a balance testing between the
government interest in protecting the border and preserving individual rights. 255
Such a ruling would follow the reasoning in Riley by recognizing electronic
devices are different than other types of personal property and deserve special
protections due to the privacy risks presented. 256 This ruling would also maintain
the government’s strong interest in securing the border by continuing to allow
manual searches of electronic devices. 257
However, a judicial holding would allow the Court to create a standard on a
matter that is typically reserved to Congress. 258 “Imposing a Fourth Amendment
floor at the border without congressional input would amount to an inflexible,
‘hugely consequential policy judgment’ that would lack the benefits of
consultation with national security officials and privacy advocacy groups, as well
as the constraining influence of legislative consensus-building.”259
Further, courts have already tried to grapple with the complex balancing test
and refused to make a decision due to the complicated issues. 260 In the Northern
District of Illinois, Judge Bucklo refused to answer whether a forensic preview is
a non-routine search requiring reasonable suspicion.261 Judge Bucklo fought
between siding with the Court’s reasoning in Riley and the reasoning in Montoya
de Hernandez.262 Unable to see a clear victor in this balancing test, Judge Bucklo
denied the motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the officers had at
least reasonable suspicion for the search. 263
B. A Congressional Solution
In lieu of a Supreme Court ruling, Congress should pass a statute to resolve
the circuit split by requiring reasonable suspicion in order to conduct a forensic

254. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border require reasonable suspicion).
255. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (engaging in a balancing test
between the government’s interest in protecting the border and individual privacy interest).
256. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–02 (2014) (holding the search incident to arrest
exception does not apply to electronic devices absent exigent circumstances).
257. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (the court called for the
legislative branch to make a law deciding the standard needed to forensically search electronic devices at the
border).
258. Forensic Searches, supra note 238, at 1119.
259. Id. (quoting United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 151 (4th Cir. 2018)).
260. United States v. Wanjiku, No. 16 CR 296, 2017 WL 1304087, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2017).
261. Id. (“I conclude that this is not the appropriate case in which to wrestle these difficult issues to the
ground.”).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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search of an electronic device at the border. 264 A statute may be preferable to a
Supreme Court ruling because it would allow for full discussion of the issue with
stakeholders through the legislative process. 265 This statutory solution could
promote stability and clarity by defining forensic searches and providing that
only certain electronic devices, such as cellphones and laptops, deserve this
increased protection.266 Despite Judge Callahan’s concern that having law
enforcement engage in a reasonable suspicion test is unnecessarily burdensome,
the United States Customs and Border Protection has issued a directive requiring
reasonable suspicion for a forensic search.267 This directive shows a statute
requiring reasonable suspicion is feasible and not overly burdensome. 268 Through
a statutory solution, Congress can ensure the Fourth Amendment continues to
protect privacy, even at the border. 269
VIII. CONCLUSION
In May 2018, a circuit split emerged putting the Eleventh Circuit at odds
with the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.270 The Eleventh Circuit held reasonable
suspicion is not required to conduct a forensic search of electronic devices at the
border.271 In contrast, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits held that either reasonable
suspicion or some level of individualized suspicion is required in order to
conduct this type of search. 272 Despite the strong legislative intent and historical
background on the protections afforded in the Fourth Amendment, the Eleventh
Circuit relied primarily on the border search doctrine for support in reaching its
conclusion.273 The other two circuits relied on the Fourth Amendment for support
in requiring some level of suspicion.274
To resolve this circuit split, the Supreme Court or Congress should set out a
standard governing the level of suspicion required at the border to create
uniformity throughout all of the United States’ borders.275 Reasonable suspicion

264. See, e.g., Traveler’s Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 4 (proposing to require
reasonable suspicion before an electronic device could be searched at the border).
265.
See The Legislative Process, UNITED STATES H OUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
266. See Traveler’s Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 3 (providing definitions for
the bill, such as “electronic equipment”).
267. Kevin McAleenan, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Directive No. 3340-049A, at 5 (Jan. 4, 2018).
268. See id. (requiring reasonable suspicion before an “advanced search” may be conducted).
269. See, e.g., Traveler’s Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. § 4 (proposing to require
reasonable suspicion before an electronic device could be searched at the border).
270. Supra Part I.
271. Supra Part I.
272. Supra Part I.
273. Supra Part II.
274. Supra Part IV.
275. Supra Part VI.
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should be the standard to conduct a forensic search of an electronic device at the
border.276 The clear language of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as well as the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Riley,
indicate the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
encompasses electronic devices, even if searched at the border. 277

276. Supra Part VI.
277. Supra Part VI.
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